On today’s episode of SNAFUBAR we dive into the first episode of the ongoing theme of “Stalled Supply Lines” where we will be investigating instances how U.S. military institutions either failed, or were prevented, from properly supplying troops in the field with necessary equipment.
Now, this theme isn’t meant to be a flat out condemnation of the institution. There are times where predictions fail, where unforeseen circumstances affect real people. There’s also times where, with hindsight being 20/20, we might ask ourselves how this happened in the first place. It’s these types of questions we’re going to be examining in each episode.
This time, we’ll be discussing winter uniforms, or the lack there of, during the Korean War.
So, strap on your parkas, if you got them, and let’s dive in.
SNAFUBAR is hosted by Sara Hart, who teaches Religious Studies at Cal Poly Humboldt, and Jeff Crane who is an Environmental Historian and Dean of the College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Cal Poly Humboldt.
Research and writing for the show is done by Liam Salcuni and Roman Sotomayor
SNAFUBAR is produced by Abigail Smithson and brought to you by the College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Cal Poly Humboldt.
Works Cited:
The Hungnam and Chinnampo Evacuations
Chosin Reservoir: Battle, Fighting Retreat, Evacuation
Combating Cold Korea
New Treatments for Frostbite
Chosin Reservoir
The Chosin Few
The Hungnam and Chinnampo Evacuations
The Korean War Battle of Chosin, How Military Medics Saved the ‘Chosin Frozen’
Transcript:
[ Music ]
>> You are about to embark upon the great crusade.
>> The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it.
>> Only the dead have seen the end of war.
>> We will accept nothing less than full victory.
[ Music ]
>> You're listening to SNAFUBAR at Cal Poly Humboldt.
>> Hi, everyone, and welcome back to the SNAFUBAR. SNAFUBAR is a podcast that looks at stories from military history and in moments of U.S. military blunders. We try to add context and -- and we try to keep it accessible to a wide range of audiences here. These histories that we're looking at are -- are meant to make clear the ways in which America is a warful nation, that we're not really dedicated to maintaining the kind of peaceful presence in the world, historically speaking. We'll also throughout this podcast really try to clarify and -- and -- and highlight the degree to which we romanticize and fetishize the military as -- as a nation despite not really providing the support that service members need. My name is Sara Hart. I teach Religious Studies at Cal Poly Humboldt and I am the daughter of a marine combat veteran.
>> Hi, I'm Jeff Crane. I am Historian and Dean of the College of Arts, Social Sciences Humanities also at Cal Poly Humboldt. Besides being colleagues, Sara and I are friends. We have a shared interest in informed and accurate telling of history, especially when it comes to war, and both of us have a deep investment in veteran's issues. I'm a veteran. My father also served during the Vietnam War. I'm also a historian. I work primarily focused on environment in the west and climate change, but I've also done a lot of work around military history, environment and political social change related to that, and the issues of trauma and moral injury.
>> Okay. So, for today's episode of SNAFUBAR, we're going to dive into what -- what's likely to become something like an ongoing and recurring theme for us, stalled supply lines. In stalled supply lines, we'll be investigating instances where U.S. military institutes either failed or were prevented from properly supplying troops in the field with necessary equipment. So --
>> And, if I can just jump in, I -- I -- I think it's safe to say that most people don't understand the importance of supply lines and logistics and managing war, right?
>> Yeah. No, I think Americans in general, like we didn't know the phrase supply lines until COVID slowed down our Amazon purchases, right?
>> Right, supply chains, yeah.
>> Right. Supply chains --
>> Yeah.
>> -- all of a sudden became a thing. And -- and, you know, you think about it in the context of mobilizing just really large numbers of people in very dangerous circumstances and the supply lines are -- are intensely important. And so -- and -- and it's -- and they're also intensely complex, and so we want to recognize that and -- and what we're doing here is looking at some moments where those supply lines get tangled but recognizing that it's just a -- it's really easy to tangle them, you know. This -- it's -- the theme is not meant to be a flat out condemnation of the institution of American military institutions. There -- there are times when predictions fail, where unforeseen circumstances affect real people and -- and you can't control those, right? There's also times where, you know, with 2020 hindsight, we might ask ourselves how -- how this happened in the first place. Hopefully, we can learn a little something from it. It's these types of questions we're going to be examining in each episode of stalled supply lines. This time, we'll be discussing winter uniforms during the Korean War, so strap on your parkas, if you've got them, and let's dive in.
>> I don't have a parka.
>> You don't have a parka?
>> No.
>> Oh. Fortunately for us, we're in the temperate zone of Northern California. Let's -- let's start out here with a -- with a little bit of an introduction to the Korean War. I think not all of our listeners maybe know as much about it. It's been called the forgotten war. Perhaps some of us out here in podcast land have forgotten it. In an article, American Involvement in the Korean War, historian Hong-Kyu Park states that the Korean War was a unique crisis within the Cold War. The Joints American Russian Occupation of Korean at the end of World War II was intended to turn Korea into a single unified and independent democratic nation. Intended. However, disagreements about how to accomplish this led to the division of Korea into two parts, communist and non-communist. The start of an armed conflict in Korea fed into some U.S. notions that communist victories anywhere in the globe would threaten U.S. interest everywhere.
>> But they were freedom loving allies during World War II, and we want to understand that better. Watch John Ford's propaganda films during the war called Why We Fight, and his depictions of the Soviet Union as freedom loving folks. It's pretty interesting. Compared to the degree to which we enter into a [inaudible] struggle with the Soviet Union immediately after World War II. It's worth saying here that this is a [inaudible] of influence issue, right?
>> Yeah.
>> So, we're -- we're trying to control as much of the world as we can and limit the control the Soviet Union, we're not worrying as much about China yet, because China hasn't "fallen to communism yet." That's two years out, right?
>> That's right.
>> 49, so. I want to read a short bit and then we can talk about it. Just a short bit --
>> Okay. Okay.
>> -- from -- from a lovely document called National Security Council Document Number 68 and understand that the Soviet Union were allies and we portrayed them as freedom loving allies, and within two years, they're now our -- our most brutal enemy. So, hear -- hear this line, the Soviet Union unlike previous -- unlike previous aspirants to Gemini is animated by a new fanatical faith antithetical to all our -- to our own and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has therefore become endemic and has waged on the part of the Soviet Union by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency, and there's a bit more, so.
>> Fanatical faith. This is what we're painting the Soviet Union, and we can't overemphasize the degree, which two years earlier, we were -- we were allies. We were -- we would not have won -- the allies would not have won World War II without the Soviet Union's massive contribution.
>> And, they probably would not have won on the eastern front without the massive amount of supplies and equipment we gave them. One example, 8,000 locomotive engines.
>> Okay.
>> Fighters, bombers --
>> Yeah.
>> -- trucks, fire hoses. That was the first that lend, you know, so yeah.
>> So, it -- it was a real partnership, and that real partnership we're seeing two years later is -- is corroding through like not just falling apart, it -- it's coming through massive distrust and that us v. them or Monician [phonetic] vision of the world.
>> Well, you know, St. Augustine who's somewhat fam -- popular in the Roman Catholic was a Monician for a while --
>> Yeah.
>> -- before he converted to Christianity. It took him a while. Let's say, let me be chased, just not yet, is that the [multiple speakers] this line.
>> Just not yet. Yes.
>> I mean, Manichaeism was believed and basically a -- a conflict between good and evil.
>> Right.
>> Truth and the why, right? I use that phrase a lot. The why is essentially evil. And, beyond that, I don't know much more.
>> Yeah. This is, I mean, it's definitely not the center of my area of expertise, but I'll tell you, the Manichaen world view and the tradition from which it's from was painted the cosmos, the world and our place in it as rigidly dualistic in a way that late 20th Century American versus Soviet relationships, it's a good analogy.
>> Originally, dualistic is a great phrase to use here because that's how we approach all of these relationships in the ton -- context of the Cold War, right?
>> Yep.
>> Like, Vietnam originally wants to be a constitutional nation, right? They want our support. Nope, you're a communist.
>> Yeah.
>> Right. Cuba, right, again, again, and again. It's like there's -- there's only, you know, there's two sides. There's us, the freedom loving, capitalist embracing, religious people, and then first Soviet Union communism and then Chinese communism.
>> I guess the main points to take away here is we are in a world where shortly after the Soviets were allies in World War II, we are now on the other side of a firmly dualistic line. There's no gray here. These are the bad guys, and it's not just bad, they're evil.
>> As -- as portrayed.
>> As portrayed, right. Yes. And, by NSE68 which you just -- the fanatical faith of them. So, two months before the Korean War kicks off, this document, which Jeff, you just read from, lands on President Truman's desk. It articulates the subversive and corrupt nature of the Soviet Union, posing a threat to democracy in the United States and the world more broadly. Very vague, but it's clear that the Soviets are our enemy. This launches the U.S. into a global war on terrorism. Like, this is the document. We will turn -- what I say?
>> You said terrorism [laughter].
>> Oh, dear [laughter].
>> I -- I know you [multiple speakers] --
>> Colorful adages, though.
>> We have not yet pivoted to --
>> We have a war on something pretty much all the time, so I can understand.
>> Right. So --
>> It is war on drugs, war on, I don't know.
>> Inaudible.
>> War on [inaudible], war on [multiple speakers] communism, war on terror.
>> You think we're still on war on tear -- I'm not sure. So, we have -- this moment NSC68 kind of pins for us to the timeline is a moment when we have, as a nation, pivoted from fighting fascism to fighting communism. We are here clearly against communism. This launches the U.S. into a global war on communism. This document further articulates that for the purposes of national and global security, the U.S. needs to implement a massive buildup of military arms. Like, that's how we're going to save ourselves. Article 8, Section 5 reads quote, "a further increase in the number and power of our atomic weapons is necessary in order to assure the effectiveness of any U.S. retaliatory blow.
>> All right. Dr. Strangelove references, anyone? We shall not have a missile gap.
>> No missile gaps here. We're -- we're -- we're on it. Who -- who exactly begins this content -- this conflict continues to be of great dispute, right? We're talking Korea now, like, North Korean sources maintain the fighting was started by the U.S. With U.S. and South Korean sources arguing the opposite.
>> Okay. I'm still stuck on NSC [inaudible] -- NSC council document Number 68. I want to read another passage.
>> Okay.
>> There's two passages I want to read here. One is to sort of double done on the Monician ridual [phonetic] -- rigidly dualistic approach of the document. One quote is, “The implacable purpose of the slave state, i.e., the Soviet Union, to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite polls. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.” And, what you see there, that language, you have a blank check for just about anything, right?
>> Yeah.
>> [Inaudible] you have so completely othered the enemy in this Cold War. And look, we're not naive. We know the Soviet Union was engaged in overthrowing governments and assassinations and gathering up as much territory as they can. This is not -- we're talking about the United States approach to this, right? But then thinking about what's going on politically, and -- and I love teaching this document when I teach post World War II America, because as soon as I just bring it in, they just go to town, right? There's so many passages, but this one too, from this idea of freedom, I'm quoting now, "from this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society." This is the explanation of the strength of a free man. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. So -- there's more. And so, they're writing this in a way to -- to -- to uplift America versus Soviet Union, but it feels like a very aspirational --
>> Yeah.
>> -- it feels like very aspirational language given what's happening right now politically, right? Especially --
>> Yeah. Or, even what was happening then, right? I mean, I'm -- I'm won over. Democratic pluralism and --
>> Diversity.
>> -- diversity and I -- I -- I do agree that we need a huge like -- the NSC68 in this moment has me completely won over. That aspirational language is -- is great. And -- and, I think this is really the key. We're talking about Korea today, but this is -- this is what we're looking at, is the ways in American history where what we say and how we behave are different. And so, our vision of a dualistic world where we're the good guys and they're the bad guys would work if -- a little better if we did the good guy thing.
>> Yeah, the good guy thing.
>> Yeah. Okay. Okay. So, who started this war? I guess that's kind of where we're at. Like, we're in -- in Korea. North Korea's going to tell us that it was the U.S. U.S. and South Korea, their sources are going to argue that it -- the opposite. They're going to say it was North Korea who started this. And, this is -- this is a big question about it. It's like how -- who starts wars and how does the narrative of who starts the -- who started it affects the way we deploy our resources.
>> Well, Hitler also argued that polls were doing things to justify the invasion of Poland, but we have no questions about who actually invaded Poland.
>> Right.
>> So, in this case, right, North Korea.
>> North Korea started it. Maybe --
>> I mean, the ones that roll across the lawn.
>> Mm-hm.
>> Yeah.
>> We could -- we could totally do an episode on -- on who started it, right? It makes me think of Lincoln Spot Resolutions and --
>> I don't know that.
>> Yeah. He's -- when young Mr. Lincoln went in the -- in the house way, you know, before he was -- well before he was President --
>> Oh, you're talking about the Mexican American --
>> I am talking about the Mexican American War, where the claim was that the U.S. start -- U.S. blood was shed. Mexico started that U.S. blood was shed, and he stood on the House floor and said you show me the spot.
>> Yeah.
>> Show me the spot that happened and we'll go to war. And, it went down as his spot resolutions, but these moments where you're like somebody points a finger and said you started it.
>> Right.
>> And, like so much in the adult world, you want to be like oh, this feels like we're in a playground. He started it, no he started it, here come my tanks, but you started it, you made me roll these tank over. Okay. Back to Korea. On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces within the North Korean People's Army or the NKPA, numbering approximately 135,000 crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. So, point all the fingers you want, here come the tanks. This action was condemned by the UN. The UN passed UN Security Council Resolution 82 and called for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces. By June 27, 1950, so it's two days later, the UN released another Security Council Resolution which declared North Korea's actions to be a breach of the peace. They also recommended UN members provide assistance to South Korea for the sake of repelling the attack and restoring peace to the Korean peninsula. And, on June 28, we're now three days deep, 1950, Seoul was captured by North Korean forces.
>> It was a devastating and fast --
>> Yea.
>> -- advance by the North Koreans --
>> Yeah.
>> -- yeah.
>> And, yeah, and so the UN is getting it together to pretty quickly respond with resolutions, but the -- on the ground, it's still happening. July 1, the first U.S. ground combat troops named Task Force Smith landed in South Korea at Busan. Traveling northwest to Osan from there. Task Force Smith would be successful on July 5 in delaying NKPA from taking Osan.
>> Now, the American troops were not in what we might call fine fighting fettle at that point in time. They had not been training extensively. They were out of shape.
>> Fettle.
>> Yeah.
>> Fine fighting fettle.
>> I think that's the right word.
>> Okay.
>> Yeah. Is it medal or fettle?
>> Medal. There's people have medal. I would -- I'm taking fettle. They were not in fine fighting fettle.
>> Well, the literation works, right?
>> It's good.
>> Yeah.
>> That's very good. So, these troops that are going in are not in fine fighting fettle. On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 84 and authorized the U.S. to form and lead a unified command composed of military forces from UN member states. This command would operate under the UN flag, and that was important --
>> Okay.
>> -- at the time.
>> So -- yeah, that is important. So, I'm seeing a lot of resolutions.
>> Yeah.
>> I've been waiting for the U.S. Declaration of War.
>> Oh.
>> Waiting.
>> Waiting.
>> Waiting. Oh wait, we haven't had one since --
>> Waiting.
>> -- World War II.
>> Waiting [laughter]. What does Congress do? Okay. In late July, another resolution. Okay. We've got resolutions, and these are coming from the United Nations. The Amer -- the Americans for better and for worse, for good reasons and for shifty reasons didn't want to be the aggressor here, right? America wants to be part of a global force. So, another, Resolution 85, called for United Nations Command or UNC to investigate the requirements for relief to and support for the people of South Korea. We're going to -- we're going to look into what it's going to take to help the South Koreans. More ground fighting would take place be -- during and between these resolutions.
>> Yeah, there's a couple more pieces of context that I think help us understand our role in South Korea. One is after World War II, for the first time in American History, we did not have a massive demobilization of our military. And, again, there's been that tradition in American history because we distrust professional militaries because they're so easily used by dictators, and we look at the examples of -- of Rome, for example, the fall of Rome. Many historical examples. The second piece is that at the end of World War I, we withdrew. We demobilized, we withdrew, we came a largely isolationist nation. After World War II, we embraced an international leadership role, right? And, you know, there's other ways to say that. We embraced the opportunity to expand our range and our reach and access to resources and all those [inaudible] economies that would be buying our goods via the Marshall Plan.
>> Yep.
>> But this is a significant change from the way the United States has played a role in the international community, and also, striking in compared to what's happening right now under the Trump Administration --
>> That's right.
>> -- which is -- we're pulling way back on those things.
>> Which again for better and for worse, this is complicated. That could be its own SNAFUBAR. I have tangled thoughts, but what key Korea is international collaboration, front and center, really, like, I mean, maybe a little bit even protesting too much. Like, this is definitely a UN operation, like who's running it. Definitely not America. Who's at the front? America.
>> It's mostly America troops.
>> It's mostly Americans, but --
>> But it's international.
>> It was very important that it be seen as international.
>> Right. So, China had become a communist nation in 1949, or as republicans [inaudible] like to say, the democrats lost China in 1949. And, they are providing support to North Korea. And, you know, again, for them, that's probably a buffer state.
>> Yeah.
>> For example, when they want to expand the Chinese model of communism.
>> Right. So, from August 4 to September 16, 1950, the U.S. and South Korean troops established the Pusan Perimeter, a defensive line emanating from the Port of Pusan in the southeastern side of the Peninsula. This perimeter would be a key factor in shifting the Korean War in the UNC's favor or the United Nation Command's favor.
>>Thank you for that acronym clarification. Abigail’s nodding.
[ Music ]
>> I know. Every time they come back, they come back like they were just all new.
[ Music ]
Now, there's much more to be said about this conflict and the timeline of events and the complexities of the buffer state situation and the, you know, imminent world war -- Cold War situation. However, what we're exploring today is a separate piece of these actions. What we're looking at is the distribution of winter uniforms to allied troops during the Korean War and the effects that the lack of proper uniforms had on the troops. To do this, we'll be zeroing in on a specific battle, the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir.
>> So, you're saying that maybe we went to war not completely prepared to go to war?
>> I know, [inaudible] but if you could see me, I'm clutching my pearls --
>> Is that a thing we do?
>> It's -- it's really, you know, this is the degree to which preparation matters. What's the -- what's the acronym? What's the -- what's the saying? Proper preparation prevents *bleep* poor performance.
>> That sounds like something a marine would say.
>> Did I get that right? I think I got that right [laughter].
>> I don't know the phrase.
>> Okay.
>> Well, hey, you know, even -- even Nazi Germany who gets probably way too much credit for how they prepared for their war. They did not have tanks that operated in winter conditions when they invaded the Soviet Union.
>> There have been [inaudible] what the weather in the Soviet Union was like. They were very familiar with it. Okay. So, America wasn't quite as familiar, but we're looking into facts. Okay. To do this, we're going to be zeroing in on a specific battle, the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. And, you want to get to the Chosin Reservoir, you -- you've got to start with the Landing in Inchon. This is Operation Chromite. This is how we get here. It's one of MacArthur's greatest achievements. If you thought amphibious landings were a World War II thing, you'd be wrong. You'd be missing something. They're -- they're a big deal here too.
>> And, it was not a great place to do an amphibious landing. They kind of defied all the rules.
>> It was supposed --
>> Yeah.
>> -- like you look at this, you look at the plan, you're like this should fail, this should totally fail. It was a little bit miraculous. The pictures that we have are pretty astounding. So, it's worth looking up if you want to see some images. The Landing at Inchon is a good imagistic moment. September 15, 1950, so we're kind of hurdling through 1950 here. The X Corp slams onto the sandy shores of Inchon about 24 miles from the capital of South Korea, which is Soeul.
>> So, they're behind the North Korean line.
>> They are.
>> Yeah.
>> Yeah. Their goal is to recapture Soeul and free civilians from the North Korean People's Army or the NKPA. X Corp under the command of Major General Edward Almond consisted of the U.S. Army's Third and Seventh Infantry Divisions, the first marine division, and also South Korean troops. The landing at Inchon and the sustained push further into enemy territory afforded UN troops greater access to roads and airspace that could move soldiers in and civilians out, right? That's what they -- this is like a supply lines for humans moment. It was -- it was very thoughtful if ambitious on MacArthur's part. Now, additionally, this position enabled UN troops to push further north, up the Korean peninsula. The territory acquired after the Inchon landing provided UN troops with a moral boost. I mean, it really was a big win.
>> Wins matter.
>> They matter.
>> Yeah.
>> You're just better at the --
>> Yeah.
>> -- next step if you got a little bit of that positive adrenalin going.
>> That's why Lee made a lot of his mistakes. He kept thinking that the high moral meant victory over overwhelming numbers, but yeah.
>> We'll see China do that? Well, yeah. Okay. X Corp was able to recapture the South Korean capital. That's kind of like -- that was huge. So, General MacArthur's goal, and certain Major General Almond's goal too, was to eliminate enemy resistance and push allied troops to the borders of Southern China. All the way. The objective was to get allied troops up to the Ula River [phonetic], North Korea's northern most extreme. Now, why did the UN need to be on China's borders? To deter China from sending further troops to aid the Korean allies.
>> And, just a BTW, by the way, China kept saying things like do not approach the Yalu River, do not approach the Yalu River. Well, and this is where MacArthur plays his hand. And, by the way, he has a history of this. I'm going to jump all the way back to his career in 1932 when he was an army -- he was a general in 1932. I think Eisenhower was a major and was an aid to MacArthur. His chief of staff of the army serving under Herbert Hoover, a name we should all know as we enter into problematic economic times.
>> Welcome to the next Hooverville.
>> Yeah. And --
>> But wait, wait, wait, Eisenhower is an aid to MacArthur?
>> Yeah.
>> Wow.
>> Patton -- serves under --
>> Okay.
>> -- Patton serves under MacArthur and Eisenhower I think was a major and was an aid.
>> Okay.
>> If I remember correctly. And, there was something called the Bonus Army. These were World War I veterans that in 1924 had been promised a bonus to adjust their compensation for their service in World War I, which had become a very, very increasingly unpopular war following our victory in World War I, but it was not [inaudible] until 1945. The conditions of the Great Depression 1932, these veterans marched on DC. I want to say around 50,000 veterans with their families on the occupied Anacostia Flats when they moved into the city and the occupied empty government buildings and they demanded early payment. Hoover gives order for them to be cleared out of their -- the buildings and also out of the main encampment along the -- along the Potomac River, the Potomac River. There's a first attack, they drive them out, and there's a second attack. MacArthur exceeds his orders, right, and they actually attack them with teargas tanks. They don't fire the tanks, but the tanks could have as far as I know, and fixed bayonets, crossed the river and attacked them twice more in violation of Hoover saying specifically do not attack them anymore.
>> Right. These are American veterans of World War I.
>> These are American --
>> With their families.
>> There was a three star marine general helping lead the Bonus Army, if I remember correctly. This -- so what we have here -- it was really funny, because later on, Eisenhower's wife said, I told that dumb son of a *bleep* not to have a public face in this.
>> Yeah.
>> Not to be there himself, but this is MacArthur. He loves -- he loves the camera, he loves the attention and has a history, and I'm saying this for specific reasons, of exceeding his orders.
>> Right.
>> Right.
>> We should do a whole episode on the Bonus Army.
>> The Bonus Army would be great. [Multiple speakers] MacArthur could be fun because MacArthur is a very interesting figure and I think because of his success at Inchon, there's a tendency to overstate how effective he was as a military leader.
>> Right.
>> But I'm not an expert on it, so I could be wrong.
>> We'll come back to that. MacArthur's over -- over -- overplaying his hand. That's where we're at in -- in Korea. MacArthur and Almond strategy though it worked in overwhelming the NKPA here.
>> Right.
>> That's where -- so it -- it worked. The success of X Corp's landing and the assault at Inchon set the stage for UN troops to make further advances into North Korea. From Inchon and Pusan and the south, UN troops pushed further north. General MacArthur remarked to President Harry Truman that North Korea's "organized resistance will be terminated by Thanksgiving." I mean, it's not very modest, not very demure.
>> Nope. Yeah.
>> But hey, it's, you know, it's swift and it's decisive as an allied victory.
>> And, it's --
>> That's the idea.
>> And, it's a win, right?
>> Yeah.
>> So, at this point, the UN could then claim and the United States to have defeated North Korea, right, and create a -- a unified Korean state --
>> Yeah.
>> -- under the U.S. fear of influence. So, what goes wrong?
>> What goes wrong? And, I'm thinking wait, but that's not what the map looks like. So, something happened. All in all, UN troops are riding this wave of success. They continue to make advances into northern parts of Korea, which is how we get to the Chosin Reservoir. Now, at the end of this battle, those very same members of the X Corp will become to -- will come to be known as the frozen chosen.
[ Music ]
>> I read comic books as a kid --
>> Yeah.
>> -- depicting the war in North Korea --
>> Yeah.
>> -- and these men freezing and -- and them being overwhelmed later by Chinese forces.
>> Yeah.
[ Music ]
So, the battle of Chosin Reservoir, November 26 to December 13, 1950. This is a battle that lasts a little over two weeks. And, the UN troops at Chosin consisted of U.S. Marines, Army, and Navy and Republic of Korea soldiers. At Chosin, 13 people earned the Medal of Honor, ten marines, two army soldiers, and one navy pilot. This is our nation's highest military medal for bravery and courage on the battle field. So, where did all this go wrong? You know, what happened? Like we mentioned earlier, the primary arbiter of military operations in Korea was General Douglas MacArthur, a seasons military commander, leader of the allied forces in the Pacific during World War II. MacArthur was known for his fast paced approaches to military operations, which actually served UN troops well in their initial landings in Korea. In the long run though, this became an unfavorable approach to military strategy and would lose him the favor of President Truman.
>> Yeah. You know, I think it -- this is where it gets touch and, you know, some people will -- when you're being critical of a -- a military commander on the field of battle or in a campaign people will say well it's easy to be critical now. That's part of our job, right? We look at war to understand what happened, also to be better prepared for the next time around. So, for a commander leading, you know, troops strategically, tactically, they have to balance so many different things. You need the victories, right?
>> Right.
>> The victories -- it's not just -- the victories are important on the battlefield. They're also important for the moral of the troops because troops that feel good about what they're doing and they're -- like they're going to win, they can -- they'll fight more effectively. And also, it's about political support, right? You know, you are sending that victory back home to the domestic front, the politicians, and they will keep providing you the support you need, both rhetorically in terms of resources, yet over pursuit of victories and not, you know, not securing your supply lines, not making sure you have the right equipment, and extending your supply lines too far can make you extremely vulnerable. So, it's, and again, it's a real easy thing to say from -- from our perspective, but I think, you know, he -- he had that taste in his mouth, right?
>> Yeah.
>> We can wrap this up, I -- we can win this, and what he -- what he was tasked to do, MacArthur was known to have just like a massive ego, but how do you do what he did without having --
>> Right.
>> -- a massive ego? But this is what he's asked to do. Now, I -- I can't remember if it's at this point he's starting to extend beyond his orders. I don't think quite yet. But he wants to secure all of Korea.
>> He wants to secure, and it's a gamble. It's a gamble he, you know, America feels at this moment that it needs to win, but it's a gamble that if -- if you push too far, you're -- you're really going to, I mean, this is 1950 and we're looking down the barrel of what we don't yet know is the Cold War, so. The rapid success of UN troops in Korea puts China on high alert.
>> Right.
>> Okay. Keep in mind now, China has been a communist entity for one year. The UN success against the communist in North Korea posed an eminent threat to China's influence in the region, prompting the Chinese to mobilize over 100,000 troops at the North Korean border.
>> If I can interject really quickly too.
>> Yeah.
>> You know, we -- if you go back to the -- what we read from the National Security Council document number 68, we don't differentiate Chinese or [inaudible] communism from Soviet communism. They are distinct. They are different, right? We just, you know, there -- there's so much rhetoric already in the United States about how to regain control of China --
>> Yeah.
>> -- from the communist, so that is actually occurring. I think Lloyd Bentsen at one point was talking about dropping nuclear bombs on China.
>> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> Yeah, this is -- they're all in the same bucket for us, which is the evil other. So, poke the evil other bear and the evil other launches a massive campaign with 100,000 troops, right, to the North Korean border. You -- this isn't the -- a situation that's fostering, cool headed negotiations or peace. It's just not, you know. So, these troops covertly moved into North Korea as a buffer to UN encroachment.
>> Can I jump in one more time?
>> Yes.
>> We had -- we had a -- we had planes flying aviation -- flying observation missions, and these Chinese troops were so disciplined, they would march and when there was the sound of a plane, they would -- they would stop in place and cover and look down. The way you give yourself away to arial observation is to look up --
>> Uh-huh.
>> -- and the light kind of bounces off your face. So, they were able to move these troops into place, even though we had arial observation.
>> Yeah. That's --
>> So, we were [inaudible] --
>> That's impressive.
>> -- surprised. Yeah.
>> Yeah. Somebody was reserved and well trained. Okay. So, eventually fighting breaks out. Surprise, surprise. At the northern most reaches of the Korean peninsula, which is how we get to the battle of the Chosin Reservoir. By October 26, the Republic of Korea's I Corp engaged Chinese troops just south of the Chosen Reservoir and so it begins. By early November 1950, UN troops are pushing forward with the goal of reaching the Yalu River border where some of the first engagements between X Corp and Chinese forces occurred. X Corp was moving north across the reservoir's eastern side with the Eighth Army Division and Republic of Korea forces advancing from the western side. UN troops packed with firepower, but the Chinese had the terrain and numbers advantage. They had that. 30,000 UN troops against 120,000 Chinese forces, but nevertheless, MacArthur and the commander of X Corp, Major General Almond were determined to advance UN troops as far north as possible under any circumstances, right? Little did they know the Chinese had hoped the UN troops would take the bait and advance up the narrow roads towards the Chosin Reservoir.
>> And, I also think of the images I have seen from, again, movies and comic books and the Chinese are depicted as swarming, right, and that's -- that's a trope that goes back to World War II and you read John Dower's War Without Mercy, the swarming of like insects, right, of another that -- it helps -- it -- it -- it's true, the UN forces were outnumbered, but it does sort of dehumanize this Chinese enemy. And, to your point, the -- the very clever way in which they are setting up the battle that's coming.
>> Yeah. They're, I mean, they're asking for it, and -- and we -- we will see more of that dehumanizing figuration as we move into the Cold War proper, right? We're just going to see a ton more of that where communists were like insects, ants, bees, the hive mind.
>> The hive mind, yeah.
>> The hive mind, right?
>> Octopus.
>> You wear the hive mind.
>> Yeah. Okay. So, the main means of advancing further north for X Corp was a narrow road that started in Humher -- Hamhung and ended at Chosin Reservoir, a distance of about 50 miles. This is a 50 mile march along a narrow passageway. UN troops are fighting and making progress further north, but the icy roads and freezing conditions made Chosin Reservoir a -- just a frozen hell. UN troops were able to inflict a lot of damage given their superior firepower, but it was clear that this was a maneuverability nightmare for UN troops.
>> I'm going to do one of my ADHD history things really quickly.
>> Yeah.
>> When you read Dante's Infernal -- Inferno, Dante's Inferno, the lowest level of hell is not a baptisy [phonetic] of fire, it's a sea of ice.
>> Right.
>> Yeah.
>> The hellish place is frozen.
>> Yeah.
>> By -- I mean, I really like this, this is the -- the hellishness of it all, we cannot -- the icy hellishness of it all we can't overestimate. By late November, the UN troops are in a dire situation. UN forces are getting hammered by Chinese troops and they're freezing to death. The same road X Corp used to launce the advance north became their own route of retreat from a formidable Chinese encirclement around Chosin Reservoir. But why were veterans of this battle dubbed the Frozen Chosen? Let's -- let's talk about that.
>> Inquiring minds want to know.
>> Yeah, inquiring minds from the chosen frozen. Well, it -- for those who don't know, the Korean peninsula experience is complex in weather conditions due to its location which causes it to have continental and oceanic climates depending on where you are. The north, for instance, experiences climates similar to its neighboring Manchuria, while the south has a climate more like Japan. This leads to significant temperature differences between summers, winters, precipitation compared to that of a nearby continent, along with its own distinct monsoon winds. Northwestern winds blow stronger in the winter compared to the southwestern summer side.
>> I do remember a few Mash episodes where they got this right, where they showed them just like all bundled up and --
>> Frozen.
>> -- freezing. Yeah.
>> Right, it's cold, you know.
>> Yeah.
>> South Korea's northern side often experiences heavy snowfall and below freezing temperatures during the winter months, and these winters tend to be really long, spanning from November until like mid-March, you know. And -- and, so this is -- this is very Danteian [phonetic]. It's very Dantesque, right? The final circle of hell is not a fiery pit. It's not some smoky, molten, red-hot plain. It's blisteringly cold, a baren landscape, frozen over, just never to be warmth by the sun, right? That's your Dante. How do you get to Dante's Ninth Circle?
>> You -- betrayal.
>> Betrayal?
>> It's -- it's [multiple speakers] --
>> Treachery.
>> -- and --
>> Cashious. No. No.
>> Cashious.
>> Is it Cashious?
>> Brutus, Cashious and Judas.
>> And, Judas.
>> Right?
>> Yeah. It's --
>> They're -- they're [multiple speakers] --
>> It's -- it's Cash -- Brutus and Cashious are in Satan's hands [inaudible].
>> He's chewing on them if I remember correctly.
>> He's chewing on Judas, I think.
>> He's chewing on Judas of betrayal.
>> Betrayal.
>> It's worse than murder and rape and [laughter].
>> Freezing.
>> Right, right.
>> We -- we can come back to the question of treason here. Okay. So, the weather conditions and circumstances that preceded the battle of the Chosin Reservoir in the fall of 1950 were in a word chilly. Soldiers in Chosin were met with unanticipated frozen wastelands with the winter season arriving earlier than forecasted.
>> Yeah. Well, so they didn't have weather forecasting in -- in -- in 1950.
>> They sure did.
>> I'm trying to -- trying to --
>> My grandpa was a weatherman for the army air corp. I know this position existed.
>> I -- I -- for whatever reason, I think that meme where they say American men think about Rome and World War II like half the time, I was actually, literally thinking about D-Day and how a weather forecaster had to say, oh look, there's a break in the weather --
>> Yeah.
>> -- let's go now. This is the fundamental question, right, when we get to what we're trying to get at in this podcast. So, what we're trying to get at is someone's responsible for doing the analysis and anticipating how things are going to go. I think probably they knew it was going to be a frozen hell. They just assumed like the Germans when the invaded Soviet Union that they would achieve victory before it was a problem.
>> Right. That it -- they'd be quick enough at it. The --
>> Because you should always assume victory when you start [laughter].
>> It's a fine line, right? You want to [inaudible] assume victory, be prepared for unintended.
>> You plan for victory, prepare for defeat.
>> There you go.
>> Yeah.
>> Okay. So, without the proper gear to keep them protected against the cold, U.S. soldiers were forced to improvise. This is where we're -- this is where we're feeling very SNAFUBAR about this whole situation, the experience of those on the ground. Writing for the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carl Warner, he detailed some of the lengths that soldiers went to to stay warm. They wrapped towels around their heads, doubled or tripled the layers of clothing that they wore. Among the artillery unit, some poured gasoline into empty 105 millimeter shell casings and turned them into heaters while others lit the ground itself aflame or --
>> So, they just poured the gas on the ground --
>> Yeah.
>> -- and lit `it.
>> Yeah. Cobbled together fires from anything they could get ahold of and included -- which included bundles of rice straw that Koreans left next to rice patties, and --
>> So, what I'm assuming here is they can't go out and gather wood because they're surrounded --
>> No.
>> -- by Chinese --
>> They're surrounded --
>> -- and North Korean troops.
>> There's not a lot of like --
>> Right.
>> -- ready, dry wood at the taking when they are burning these bundles of rice straw that, you know, the North Koreans catch onto it, and they start trapping the bundles with grenades.
>> Nice.
>> Yeah. So, it's just worse and worse and worse. And -- and, the cold affected everything, and -- and there was no standard operating procedure advisement for how to handle the frost. Batteries for powering radios and flashlights froze, truck batteries froze, grenade pins froze, firing mechanisms on M1 carbines and 50 caliber, 30 caliber machine guns froze.
>> So, I -- I want to get to the texture of this. So, I -- I've thrown a few grenades. So, the pin, you have to pull out --
>> Yeah.
>> -- it was so frozen you couldn't pull it out.
>> Yeah.
>> It wouldn't bend.
>> It wouldn't bend. And, then you've got your finger stuck to the frozen --
>> Can you imagine? You're the boy, you've got to throw --
>> Yeah.
>> -- the grenade and it won't actually pull out.
>> This is -- this is exactly the day to day that these guys are dealing with, and sometimes the mortar, the machine guns, they -- they -- they froze over completely. So, soldiers had to keep cars running overnight to jump start other vehicles. There always had to be a car running to jump start the vehicles that were going to go. They had to hideaway batteries and grenades and clothes. They urinate on their weapons when all else failed to thaw them so they would function. They rested behind exhaust pipes to stay warm, you know, huffing carbon monoxide in the hopes of not freezing to death.
>> Yeah. And, I imagine that they were -- because I -- I think there were a lot of attacks at night if I remember correctly, but they're probably wrapping cloth around weapons as well trying to keep them ready. You have to make a decision like am I going to risk frostbite or risk not having a weapon when an attack happens.
>> Yeah. And, this is in a very serious -- very serious attack mode conditions.
>> So --
>> They're marching fast.
>> Yeah, and so this is -- this is like we joked a little bit earlier about not being prepared, but this is a fundamental failure on the part of the military leadership to assume victory and not be prepared for a defeat or a victory taking longer, right, and not having that equipment in place, not have -- and, again, right, we -- it may be that we don't have truck batteries that work in this environment --
>> Yeah.
>> -- because we have not really fought in that environment as -- I say we, the United States. So, you know, I don't where I'm trying to -- I know where I'm trying to get to here. I'm not sure how to get there exactly, but to say that if we really support and respect troops the way we like to say we do, part of what we have to do is have them properly prepared, and that's, again, an easy thing to say.
>> Right.
>> When -- when it looked like complete and total victory was in -- within their grasp.
>> Right. There's just too many pieces missing here not to pick it up as a real SNAFUBAR situation.
>> Okay. Let me ask you this, right. We have lots of movies --
>> Yeah.
>> -- and war, you know, war video games and everything else, how often do they depict these conditions, right? That kind of heroism --
>> Yeah.
>> -- doesn't look sexy, right?
>> No.
>> Like urinating on a weapon to keep it functioning.
>> No. It's -- these are the things we don't see very much of, and I -- I think that's one of the reasons we're picking this up as an -- as an episode here in the SNAFUBAR, is that this -- this did matter. It mattered enormously to the people who were on the ground.
>> And, it matters because it helps us better explicate and understand veteran's experience.
>> Yeah.
>> And, the Korean veterans, Korean war veterans, have a certain level of bitterness --
>> Yeah.
>> -- because one, it's like never talked about, and then often times it's treated as a defeat, which it is not.
>> Right.
>> Right. So, okay.
>> And, [inaudible] I mean it was a kind of a situation that was largely sort of swept under the American mythic rug. It's -- it's too close to World War II, which is too easily heroic and it's too close to Vietnam, which is too easily non-problematic. Okay. So, not only was there not a clear standing operating -- standard operating procedure, but as we've eluded to, there were also issues with supplies, uniforms especially. Shelby Stanton details this and more in U.S. Army Uniforms of the Korean War.
>> That sounds like a fun read.
>> Pretty fun read. Our -- our -- our researchers loved it. They -- they recommended to everyone.
>> I can't wait for the Netflix series [laughter].
>> Material -- material levels and winter field garments were scarce worldwide at this time [multiple speakers], so that's where's it's [inaudible].
>> Because World War II [multiple speakers] the world --
>> So --
>> -- and industrial production and --
>> Yeah.
>> -- everything else, right? Okay.
>> Okay. So, we're there. Depots were located outside of Korea. The army didn't have a sizeable stock of cold weather gear since most planning was centered around occupations in temperate zones.
>> So, i.e., Japan and Europe.
>> Yeah.
>> And, well, in the Mediterranean. Okay, yeah.
>> As we frequently see in war time, the development and acquisition of new gear didn't meet requirements or even requests. Stanton notes that "many items adopted from 1948 to 1952 did not reach combatants in sufficient quantity until late in the war or after the armistice. Okay. So, supply chains. Supply chains were fraught. They were so fraught that, again, Stanton here "soldiers leaving Korea turned in most of their equipment for reissue to incoming replacements."
>> So, here's my dirty uniform, my battered rifle, good luck, buddy.
>> Yeah. Hope it fits. And -- and, what else were they supposed to do, right? The fast changing nature of this war, isolation from supply depots, shortages, lack of sufficient existing supplies, it -- it made a lot of this necessary, right, but -- but tell that to the guy who's losing his [inaudible] kind of where -- where I'm coming from. So, okay. Writing for Military Medicine --
>> Frostbite was a major problem.
>> Frostbite, as we'll get to, is a major problem. Laura Cutter [phonetic] states that "in the fall of 1950, American soldiers and their commanding officers were unprepared for their first Korean winter. When temperatures could plunge to more than 30 degrees below zero and arctic winds from Siberia yielded deadly consequences." It -- we -- we -- I mean, that's kind -- it's a very clear statement. Laura Cutter, it's a little -- feels a little understatement in this moment, right? Siberian wins, yielded deadly consequences, and we just weren't prepared. February 1951, Life Magazine reported on these conditions, stating that more than 5,300 U.S. troops suffered frostbite in that first winter. This was largely due to situations where troops were immobilized or stuck due to enemy fire. So, they -- remember, they're marching up this very narrow passage way, there's constantly like this mountainous snowy region. They were pinned down in a lot of situations, right? In these conditions, the injured would "lay for too long on frozen ground." So, trapped in these environments, the fingers, the toes, hands, feet of U.S. soldiers would begin to die.
>> I think maybe that's why we don't have a lot of popular culture around the Korean War because these were such -- such negative stories, such an indictment of our management of troops during the war.
>> Yeah.
>> We, again, we prefer other stories when it comes to the way we talk about war in this country.
>> Really painful dehumanizing moments.
>> Yeah.
>> I mean, imagine how isolated and abandoned and terrified these -- these soldiers felt.
>> Yeah.
>> Right. They're actually laying in a foxhole freezing to death.
>> Yeah.
>> Or suffering from frostbite.
>> For want of a coat.
>> Yeah.
>> So, during these outbreaks of frostbite, army surgeons were noted to have realized that they thought -- that what they thought was frostbite during World War II had actually been trench foot, which what this meant was that their treatment programs weren't prepared or designed to assist with actual frostbite. Because of this, they had to adjust really quickly to treat the blackening hands and feet of the troops as their flesh died. So, the doctors here, there's -- this is still good. The medics were not -- they were to the wall also. One young soldier profiled in the 1951 Life Magazine article stated that when he managed to get through enemy lines to -- to the marines, "it took them almost 30 minutes to get my boots off. They were froze stuck to my feet." Upon arriving in Japan, the soldier was told he would lose most of his feet.
>> And, I have to say, I'm a little surprised that Life Magazine had this level of access --
>> Yeah.
>> -- who was willing to share these details.
>> The same article includes photos detailing the process of frostbite, images showing you as soldiers recovering in rows of cots. A photo was -- of a soldier enjoying his final cigarette is included, noting that -- these soldiers, you know, they couldn't smoke upon arriving for treatment as nicotine further constricts the blood vessels, vasoconstrictors as we know. Luckily, the article states that "Cokes and candy helped the men forget their cigarettes."
>> I imagine after what they went through, Cokes and candy would have been very, very nice.
>> I -- I think they would have been deeply appreciated. We've got --
>> Along with cigarettes.
>> Yeah. Feet froze into blocks of ice inside boots. This type of boot, the type of boot these -- these troops were -- were wearing, often called the Mickey Mouse boot due to its oversized, all black appearance, was common in World War II and Korea. Marines -- Marines at Chosin wore the earlier versions of these boots, and unfortunately, this version was made with a leather and rubber design that just didn't prevent cold from getting in. It wasn't intended to and it -- and it didn't. Speaking for PBS -- PBS's Chosin Reservoir Documentary, Bill Mills [assumed spelling] of the United States Marine Corp said "we were pretty short of everything. Worse was the shoepacks. Like, all those rubber boots that came up halfway to your knees, the bottom portion of them were rubber, and as long as you were moving, they worked good. But climbing those hills, your socks would get wet from sweat. You had no way to change the socks, so if you laid in the snow all night, your feet would freeze.
>> Yeah, you know, and as someone who's done a lot of hiking and backpacking, I know that, you know, if I'm backpacking in conditions like this that every so often I change my socks because they've gotten wet --
>> Yeah, and --
>> -- because I had the supplies, but again, they just don't have the supplies, the equipment to be able to care for themselves, right?
>> They don't have the supplies, they don't have the equipment. They also have the problem that like they have to peel freezing socks off their feet, which --
>> And, they can't really take their boots --
>> -- removes their skin.
>> -- to warm their feet because their feet would be so swollen --
>> Yeah.
>> -- they can't get their boots back on.
>> Right.
>> Right. And, what if there's an attack during that moment, right?
>> Yeah. Another speak for this PBS documentary stated that when moisture was captured within the boots, which was all the time, "it was like walking on ice," because it was. Even bullet wounds sometimes froze, keeping soldiers from bleeding out until they went inside heated tents.
>> Oh, we -- we just made lemonade out of lemons.
>> Yeah, yeah [laughter]. We have an extra few minutes, you know.
>> Yeah.
>> Another Chosin survivor stated, fellows that had gunshot wounds, I mean, bad, bad gunshot wounds, it was so cold their blood froze. They managed to stay alive. Guys without a leg, it was so cold, everything congealed and they managed to live.
>> I wonder if that infected -- affected infection rates at all.
>> Maybe slowed it due to frozen --
>> Right.
>> Yeah. At the battle of Chosin, nearly twenty-five hundred in the U.S. forces died. Many froze to death, 5,000 were wounded and 8,000 suffered frostbite in the negative 36 degree Fahrenheit cold. Survivals -- survivors called themselves the Chosin Frozen, and marines who fought there known as the Chosin Few.
>> Since of humor, right? We talk about that a lot with veterans.
>> Reflecting on the battle for PBS's American Experience Series, Army Veteran John Edward Gray [assumed spelling] states "there's no comparison between the two where physical hardship is concerned. At Chosin, there was no rest for the weary, there was no place for the frozen." Troops at Chosin broke through their encirclement and fought their way to the Port of Honam. From there, they were evacuated along with 91,000 Korean refugees and what is considered the largest sea evacuation in U.S. military history, an event which involved over a hundred thousand military perpenelis [phonetic] -- personnel. It's -- it's really a proper U.S. Dunkirk moment.
>> Yeah. That's a -- that's a way to put it, like kind of a clear frame around that.
>> Yeah. So, many of the survivors would be disembarked at locations where they could regroup before rejoining the fighting. They would not make it home for Christmas. And, you know, so our -- our researchers have really worked hard to look into Chosin survivors and -- and there's fewer and fewer of them, but they continue to cope with their injuries, long term health problems such as changes in muscle, skin, nails, ligaments, and bones. Skin cancer and frostbite scars. Yeah. Neurologic injury with symptoms such as bouts of pain in the extremities, hot or cold tingling sensations, and numbness. A lot of really extreme neuropathy. Vascular injury with symptoms such as extremities becoming painful or white or discolored when cold. So, you just can't be in the cold anymore.
>> You know, in military life, even peacetime military life, there's a lot of damage to bodies, and I think it's another piece we don't talk about enough is the amount of damage that these -- these bodies incur --
>> Yeah.
>> -- in both peacetime and war, and the degree to which we are effective and supporting them.
>> Yeah.
>> Right.
>> Yeah. The suffering's immense and it -- it continues for those who have served, you know, throughout their lives, at Chosin and elsewhere, in combat and not. And, it -- it's true with all combat, the continuing lifelong effects of service connected injuries.
>> And, I think, you know, I want to introduce something here something here that I -- I know we'll explore in more depth in future episodes, maybe even some standalone episodes, and this is Jonathan Shay's moral injury from Achilles in Vietnam, and I do -- I do deal with that topic in different courses that I teach, and I typically think that in terms of Vietnam War, right, or Iraq, and moral injury being -- it's a -- what's the right word I'm looking for here, it's -- it's another level up from posttraumatic stress disorder. And, my simplistic way of talking about it, posttraumatic stress disorder, if you're in combat, if you are in, you know, combat that was well planned and legitimate, and it led to the freeing of people from oppressors, you still will experience PTSD, right?
>> Yeah, loud noises --
>> From those combat environments, right, the horror of seeing people die.
>> Yeah.
>> Loud noises, explosions, all that. Moral injury is when you experience all of that and it was a war that was built on lies, it was a badly managed war, you weren't supplied properly, so I think that's another element here and I don't think of it in terms of the Korean War up until this moment, right, which is to say, these -- these men had to have felt a strong sense of moral injury from how poorly supported they were and this. So, they went from victory, victory, victory to this -- this space where they felt, you know, completely abandoned, right?
>> Yeah.
>> And so, there's the physical injuries to get through, but then there's that psychological impact of the moral injury as well, which is something we're going to unpack a lot.
>> Yeah. And, for Shay, it's the, I'm -- I'm going to loosely quote, that the moral injury is the undoing of character that -- that comes from betrayal in whatever way of -- of what's right. And so, if you participate in that, if you see it happen or -- or even if you're just -- just a witness to it, like if you were on this march through this frozen environment and you're watching your buddies rip their skin off with their boots, you don't have to be responsible for it for that to be -- for that to sit with you in a -- in a life -- with a lifetime of moral injury. So, I do, yeah, I think -- I think we don't often apply it to moments that aren't really standout errors or betrayals of values, but like in the experience of the individuals there, all it takes is to see something that it's just not quite right. It goes against what you know is right and you were there for it, and --
>> And, what you've been told. You know --
>> Yeah.
>> -- what you've been told in terms of your support and what's going to happen. And, even maybe -- and there's a ton of World War II veterans serving in Korea. Even maybe what you experienced in World War II where you had so many supplies, so much equipment, right? You -- later in the war in particular.
>> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> And, you were celebrated as heroes, in a way that here you're just not. And, you're fighting communists, but it's not clear, and you're the hero, but that's not clear either, so.
>> That sounds like the runup to another war --
>> Ah, here we --
>> -- a few years from there.
>> -- confuse us. So, here today, we focused on a really particular SNAFUBAR from Korea, which is the, you know, a mismatch in supply lines, things go wrong when missions are rushed and troops enter foreign territories unprepared.
>> Yeah, that's a pretty good summation.
>> Okay, until next time.
>> See you in the SNAFUBAR.
>> [Music] You've been listening to SNAFUBAR, a Cal Poly Humboldt production brought to you by the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. Our team includes me --
>> And, me.
>> Abigail Smithson , Producer.
>> Liam Salcuni, Writer Researcher.
>> Roman Sotomayor, Writer/Researcher.
>> You can find more information about SNAFUBAR on KHSU.org.
>> Produced at Cal Poly Humboldt.
[ Birds Chirping ]